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LEAD ARTICLE

THE EFFECT OF REPEAL OF THE BASEBALL
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION ON FRANCIIISE
RELOCATIONS
Thomas R. Hurst*
and
Jeffrey M. McFarland**

ABSTRACT

For seven decades since the Supreme Court's decision in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League, Major League
Baseball has been exempt from antitrust attack under the federal
antitrust laws. This exemption has, among other things, enabled the
owners of baseball teams, through concerted action, to control the
relocation of baseball franchises from one city to another to a
degree which would be impossible for other businesses not
enjoying an exemption from the antitrust laws. This article first
reviews the history of baseball's antitrust exemption. It then
proceeds to examine judicial treatment of horizontal market
restraints under the Sherman Act in both non-sports cases and in
cases involving sports other than baseball which do not enjoy an
antitrust exemption. The article then proceeds to examine
baseball's current rules governing franchise relocation. Finally, the
article examines whether baseball's current regulatory scheme
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could withstand judicial scrutiny if baseball's antitrust exemption
were revoked.
I. INTRODUCTION

For over 70 years Major League Baseball has been exempt from
antitrust attack under the Sherman Act.' On numerous occasions in
that time period legislators, courts, economists, and fans have
called for the abolition of baseball's exemption.' The complaints
from fans grew louder after the San Francisco Giants failed to
move to St. Petersburg in 1992.? Franchise movement has both
emotional effects and economic effects.4 Much of the complaining
is done, however, without an analysis of how a repeal5 of the
antitrust exemption would affect relocation of baseball franchises.
Instead, the antitrust laws are viewed as a "cure-all" for many of
1.. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Sherman Act §§1-8 (1890)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1993).
2.. For a chronology of the San Francisco Giants proposed relocation to St.
Petersburg, See M. Juarez, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 17 Hastings
Comm/Ent L.J. (1994) at 743-44.
3.. There have been numerous efforts in Congress over the years to modify
or repeal baseball's antitrust exemption. Following the 1994 strike, Senator
Howard Metzenbaum introduced the Baseball Fans Protection Act, S. 2380,
103rd Cong. 2nd Sess (1994) which would have partially repealed baseball's
antitrust exemption. Efforts at modification or repeal have continued in both the
House and Senate in the current legislative session. See, e.g., Curt Flood Act of
1997, S.53, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); Baseball Fans and Communities
Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 21, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); Major League
Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 704, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997);
Freedom of Movement for Baseball Teams Act of 1997, H.R. 1744, 105th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1997).
4.. Teams become such a part of a community that some psychologists have
likened the loss of a sports team to the trauma of losing a relative. CHARLES C.
EUCHNER, PLAYING THE FIELD: WHY SPORTS TEAMS MOVE AND CITIES FIGHT
TO KEEP THEM 5 (1993).

5.. Although the term "repeal" is most often used in the context of a codified
law, the term "repeal" as used in this paper will refer to the denial of the
exemption by either the courts or the legislature.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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the problems baseball has experienced in the 1980s and 1990s.
This paper attempts to explore the effect a repeal of baseball's
antitrust exemption would have on franchise relocations. Without
attempting to resolve the reasoning, part II gives a brief history of
the Supreme Court's opinions which form the basis for baseball's
exemption. Part mJ delves into the Sherman Act's prohibition of
horizontal market divisions and examines both non-sports and
sports-related cases to determine trends in the decisions. Finally,
part IV takes the trends in the decisions and applies them to
baseball's current relocation rules to determine whether a repeal of
the antitrust exemption would result in a mass exodus of teams to
other cities.6

I1.

BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST ExEMPTION:

A BRIEF HISTORY

Movement of teams from one city to another in professional
baseball and other sports has taken place throughout the history of
organized sports. As long ago as 1882, the Troy Haymakers
baseball team moved to New York City and was renamed "the
Giants. 7 In the pre-World War 1Eera franchise relocations were
primarily motivated by the desire to increase gate receipts, as
opposed to television and radio broadcast revenues.8 In the PostWar Era, franchise relocations came to be motivated primarily by
the increased revenue potential of expanding into new geographical
areas rather than by failure of fan support in the old location. The
1953 move of the Boston Braves to Milwaukee was the first of the
6. In addition to the antitrust implications, some have suggested that
regulation of franchise movement by the sports leagues interferes with the
constitutional right to travel. WARREN FREEDMAN, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND
ANTITRUST 78 (1987).

7. See "OutsIde the Laws: Brownout in Cleveland" (ESPN cable television
broadcast, Dec. 15, 1995).
8. Glenn Wong, "Of Franchise Relocation, Expansion and Competition in
Professional Sports Teams: The Ultimate Political Football?, 9 Seton Hall Legis.
J. 7 at 22-24 (1985).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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modem era moves. Even more dramatic was the simultaneous
move in 1957 by the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants to
Los Angeles and San Francisco, respectively. The advent of jet air
travel made expansion to the West Cost feasible for the first time
and the large, untapped television and radio markets in the West,
rather than lack of fan support in New York, were the primary
factors behind these moves.9 The relocation of the Milwaukee
Braves Franchise to Atlanta in the mid-1960's which enabled the
franchise to tap the vast television market in the Southeast,
underscored the increasing significance of television revenues as
an incentive for relocation." Although national television revenues
are shared among teams throughout the league, individual
franchises are entitled to keep revenues from local radio and
television contracts, concession revenues and luxury skybox
rentals." Thus the owners have an inherent incentive to play one
city off against another by bargaining for lucrative stadium leases
at nominal rentals and large shares of the revenues from parking,
concessions and luxury boxes with the threat of a move always
lurking in the background. 2
Overall, Major League Baseball and other professional leagues
have not made vigorous efforts to prevent the relocation of
franchises. 3 One study reports that between 1950 and 1982,
seventy eight franchise movements occurred in the four major
league sports.' 4Most efforts to block relocation appear to have been
directed at unpopular or "maverick" owners such as Charles Finley
of the Kansas City (later Oakland) Athletics and the late Bill Veeck
of the Chicago White Sox.'5 These efforts appear to have been
9. See generally, Charles C. Eucher, Playing the Field (1993).
10. Id.
11. See generally, Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Sports Franchise Game: Cities
in Pursuit of Sports Franchises, Events, Stadiums and Arenas at 10 (1995).
12. See Peter King, Down...and Out, Sports Illus., Nov. 13, 1995 at 28,
available in 1995 WL 12559615.
13. See James Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in
Professional Sports, 38 Law and Contemp. Probs. at 48-52.
14. John Wunderli, Squeeze Play: The Game of Owsners, Cities, Leagues
and Congress, 5 Marq. Sports L.J. at 90 (1994).
15. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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motivated more by personality conflicts than by a genuine desire to
protect the interests of the host city or of the league in general. 6
According to one study, the average value of all sports franchises
has increased at an annual rate of twenty per cent per year during
the late 1980's.17To the extent that this increase results from
bidding wars among cities for major league franchises, the owners'
self interest clearly favors a laissez faire attitude towards franchise
relocation.
The genesis of the antitrust exemption for baseball can be traced
to a New York trial court opinion in 1914.18 In American League
Baseball Club v. Chase, the New York court stated in dictum that
baseball was subject only to the civil and criminal laws of the
states, and not federal legislation, because baseball was not an
instrument of interstate commerce." The factual basis for the
Chase suit was escalating player salaries. 0 Those same "salary
wars" set the stage for the United States Supreme Court's first
encounter with baseball and the antitrust laws.
A. FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore v. NationalLeague2 '
In Federal Baseball, the Baltimore Terrapins of the Federal
League charged the National League with violating the antitrust
laws22 when the National League allegedly conspired to deny the
16. See Steven Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 643 at 653
(1989).
17. Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small Market Teams in
Major League Baseball, 4 Marq. Sports L.J. 323 (1994).
18. American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914).
19. Id. at 17. The court referred to baseball as "an amusement, a sport, [and]
a game.. .not a commodity or an article of merchandise subject to the regulation
of Congress on the theory it is interstate commerce." Id. This may explain the
commonly held notion that baseball is exempt from the antitrust laws because it
is a sport, not a business. In fact, neither Chasenor FederalBaseballso holds.
20. ANDREW S. ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK
INSIDE THE BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 9 (1992).

21. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
22. The opinion is unclear on which section of the "Anti-Trust Acts" the suit
relied on. See Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Federal League access to players.2 3 After briefly describing the
way baseball clubs compete in the major leagues, Justice Holmes
held that the business of giving exhibitions of baseball is for
regulation only by the states. 24 Although teams from different
states compete against each other, Holmes said the personal efforts
involved in the playing of baseball could not be considered
Since the Sherman Act applies only to
interstate commerce.2
"commerce among the several states," a finding that baseball was
not interstate commerce was fatal to the Terrapin's antitrust
attack.26 Thus, in short order, the Supreme Court fashioned
baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws.

23. Id. at 201. The Federal League originally brought suit in federal district
court in Illinois alleging that Major League Baseball denied them access to the
player market. ZIMBALIST, supra note 7, at 9. In November 1915, the suit was
settled and the Federal League ended after only two seasons. Id. However, one
of the plaintiffs in the suit, the Baltimore Terrapins, was given unfavorable
treatment in the settlement. Id. This unfavorable treatment was a reflection of
the other owners' opinions that Baltimore was really a "minor league city." Id.
As a result, the Terrapins club rejected its part of the settlement and instead filed
suit on antitrust grounds in 1916. Id. at 9-10. The case eventually made it to the
Indiana Supreme Court where the Terrapins recovered treble damages of
$240,000. FederalBaseball, 259 U.S. at 208. The decision was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the appeal from
that decision formed the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in Federal
Baseball. Id.
The Baltimore Terrapins brought its indivIdual suit in Indiana because the
Federal League was incorporated under the laws of Indiana. Id. at 207.
24. Id. at 208.
25. See Id. at 209. The Court saId that the fact the players had to travel
across state lines was not enough to make baseball a commodity of interstate
commerce. See Id. The travel was "a mere incIdent, not the essential thing."
Id. Holmes analogized the baseball situation to a firm of lawyers sending an
attorney to another state to argue a case. Id.
Contrary to popular thought, Holmes never held that baseball was exempt
from the Sherman Act on grounds that it is a sport, not a business. See supra,
note 6. If the Court had so held, it is not at all clear that the "sport" theory
would be grounds for an exemption from the Sherman Act since the statutes do
not require a "business," but only "commerce." See Sherman Act §§ 1-8
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8).
26. See, e.g., Sherman Act § 1 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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27
B. Toolson v. New York Yankees

Thirty-one years later, the Supreme Court was confronted again
with an antitrust attack on Major League Baseball. In Toolson,
players brought suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act on grounds they
were damaged by baseball's reserve clause. 28 The Court declined
to examine the issue, however.29 Instead, the Court issued a one
paragraph per curiam opinion in which it held that the federal
antitrust laws did not apply to baseball.3" In so doing, it relied
entirely on the result in Federal Baseball and stated that if
Congress disagreed with the ruling in FederalBaseball it had the
opportunity to bring baseball within the scope of the antitrust
laws.3" The Court said since baseball was allowed to develop for
thirty-one years on the assumption it was exempt, Congressional
legislation was necessary before the exemption would be
destroyed.32
33

C. Flood v. Kuhn

The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the
viability of baseball's antitrust exemption came in 1972 when Curt

27. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
28. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 362 (Burton, J., dissenting).
29. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Justice Burton's dissent argued at length that baseball was clearly
engaged in interstate commerce. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357-58 (Burton, J.,
dissenting). Much of his focus was on the increased use of radio and television
to broadcast the games. Id. at 359. In addition, the dissent argued that
Congressional inaction was not a reason to uphold FederalBaseball. Id. at 364.
Instead, the dissent argued that since the case law dId not support an exemption
where baseball is interstate commerce, Congressional inaction indicated that no
exemption ever existed in the first place. See Id.
33. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Flood challenged Major League Baseball's reserve system. 34 The
Court wrote at length about the cherished history of baseball" and
canvassed the facts and holdings of its prior decisions in Federal
Baseball and Toolson as well as decisions ruling on the status of
other major league sports under the antitrust laws.36 The result was
a finding that baseball was engaged in interstate commerce and that
Federal Baseball and Toolson were "aberration[s] confined to
' Nevertheless, because of the unique characteristics and
baseball."37
needs of baseball, the Court upheld baseball's antitrust
exemption.38 The Court emphasized that it was unwilling to
overturn Federal Baseball and Toolson when Congress "by
positive inaction" allowed the decisions to stand.39
34. Id. at 259. Footnote 1 of the opinion explains baseball's reserve system
in detail. Id. at 259 n. 1.
35. Id. at 260-61. Justice Blackmun authored the majority opinion. Id.
36. Id. at 269-82.
37. Id. at 282. In a concurring opinion to the decision from which Flood
appealed, Judge Moore wrote
[w]e freely acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was
not one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days.. .While we should
not fall out of our chairs with surprise at the news that Federal
Baseball and Toolson had been overruled, we are not at all certain
the Court is ready to give them a happy dispatch.
Id. at 268 n. 9. Another court referred to FederalBaseball as an "'impotent
zombie."' BOWIE KUHN, HARDBALL: THE EDUCATION OF A BASEBALL
COMMISSIONER 19 (1987).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 283-84. The appellate court said "[b]aseball's... future should not
be for politically insulated interpreters of technical antitrust statutes, but rather
should be for the voters through their elected representatives. If baseball is to be
damaged by statutory regulation, let the Congressman.. .face the consequences
of his baseball voting record." In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger stated
that while congressional inaction was not a "solid base" for the decision, it was
the least undesirable course to let Congress resolve the issue. Id. at 286 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
Justice Douglas authored a dissenting opinion which Justice Brennan
joined. Douglas saId that if the Court were writing on a clean slate, baseball
would not be exempt. Id. at 288 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas added "[t]he
unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us from correcting our own
mistakes." Id. Justice Marshall also filed a dissent which, because of its
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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There have been a number of attempts by Congress to abolish,
either partially or completely, baseball's antitrust exemption over
the past decade. Following the San Francisco Giants abortive move
to St. Petersburg, Congress held hearings to consider whether
baseball's antitrust exemption should be changed.a°Also, the 1994
Major League Players' Association strike led to serious threats of
Congressional intervention, including possible modification of the
antitrust exemption.4 However, none of these efforts has thusfar
ever been reported out of Committee and had a serious chance of
being approved by Congress.

EI.

OVERVIEW OF § 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

The general objective of the Sherman Act is to preserve free
competition and curb business restraints that restrict production,
raise prices, or otherwise introduce artificial elements into the
market to the detriment of consumers.42 Under § 1 of the Sherman
Act, these goals are promoted through the prohibition of contracts
that restrain trade in interstate commerce. 43 A violation of § 1
contains three separate elements:
extensive factual discussion of the case, may have been the original majority
opinion. Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall argued that since
baseball players lacked the numbers to form a sufficient lobby, it was a mistake
for the Court to assume that Congressional silence meant approval. Id. at 292
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. Hearings Before Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Laws of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993).
41. Proposed legislation prompted by the strike included "The Baseball Fans
and Communities Protection Act of 1994," HR 4994, 103rd Cong. 2nd Sess.
(1994) and "The Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994," S.2380, 103rd Cong.
2nd Sess. (1994).
42. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
43. Sherman Act §1 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §1). Section 1 of the
Sherman Act provIdes, in relevant part, that "[e]very contract, combination.. .or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states...is
hereby declared illegal." Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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1) a "contract, combination.. .or conspiracy";
2) "restraint of trade"; and
3) interstate commerce.'
Given the expansive reach of the interstate commerce concept, the
third element under § 1 is rarely at issue anymore.4" As a result,
the first two elements now form the crux of a § 1 action.
The first element is commonly referred to as the "concerted
action" element.46 For a violation of § 1, there must be more than
unilateral action by a single entity.47 The policy reasons behind
requiring concerted action are that when two entities combine, the
risks are higher that they will work towards monopoly status.4" In
essence, it expands the market power of the conspirators at the
44. Id. Although the language of § 1 only contains three separate elements,
the courts also require the plaintiff to have standing to sue. Brunswick Corp. v.

Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). This element derives from § 4 of the
Clayton Act which allows a person to sue if the person is "...injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbIdden in the antitrust laws...."
Clayton Act §4 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1993). Generally,
this element involves showing two things. First, the plaintiff must be the proper
plaintiff and show that the injury is not too remote. See Blue Shield of Virginia
v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). Second, the plaintiff must show that its
injury is the type the antitrust laws were designed to protect and that its injuries
flow from a violation. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. This second element is

commonly referred to as "antitrust injury." As a result, § 4 of the Clayton Act
imposes an additional element in proving a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
45. See ANTITRUST ADVISER §1.08 (Carla A. Hills ed., 2d ed. 1985). Note,
this was the element of the Sherman Act that originally was not met by the
plaintiffs in Federal Baseball. However, the Flood decision undermined the
reasoning of Federal Baseball which is in accord with the current broad
definition of interstate commerce.
46. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS §4.15 (2d ed. 1994).
The
"concerted action" element can be broken into two parts. The first part requires
two actors. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. The second part
requires an agreement between those two actors. See Monsanto Co. V. SprayRite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). Because Major League Baseball
teams clearly have an agreement, the second part of the concerted action
element is not at issue in this paper.
47. ANTITRUST ADVISER, supra note 30, at § 1.06.
48. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 31, at §4.15.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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expense of other competitors.4 9
The most important recent case that bears on the issue of
whether two entities are involved is Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.5" In Copperweld, the Supreme Court
held that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary are
a single entity for purposes of § 1 analysis. 1 Since both the parent
and subsidiary have a complete unity of interest, their actions are
decided by a single corporate consciousness. 2 As a result, they act
for the benefit of each other and cannot be considered separate
entities under the meaning of the Sherman Act.53 The Court said it
was concerned only where there was a "sudden joining of two
independent sources of economic power previously pursuing
separate interests. 5 4
In addition to requiring some agreement between two separate
entities, the agreement must be in restraint of trade. 5 Originally,
the Supreme Court took this language literally until it realized that
virtually all business contracts would be declared illegal under that
standard.5 6 As a result, the Court declared that only unreasonable
restraints of trade were illegal under the Sherman Act.57 From this
declaration two blurry lines of analysis arose.
Under a "rule of reason" analysis, the courts weigh the
procompetitive effects of the restraint against the anticompetitive
effects of the restraint. 5' This involves an examination of the facts
peculiar to the line of business, the nature of the market, and the
49. Id.

50. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
51. Id. at 777.
52. Id. at 771.
53. Id. The Court analogized a parent and subsIdiary to "...a multiple team
of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single-driver." Id.
54. Id. at 771. The Court wrote "[a] business entity should be free to
structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of control, economy of operations,
and other factors dictated by business judgment without increasing its exposure
to antitrust liability." Id. at 773
55. Sherman Act § 1 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1).
56. ANTITRUST ADVISER, supranote 30, at § 1.05.
57. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
58. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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reasons for adopting the restraint.59 A prerequisite to determining
reasonableness is defining the relevant market. The relevant
product market is determined by examining whether other products
are "reasonably interchangeable., 6' The relevant geographic
market is also a part of the overall relevant market, though rules for
determining the geographic market are virtually impossible to lay
down because it is so bound up with the product market
determination. 6' The very nature of the "rule of reason" is that
there are no hard and fast rules for determining which restraints
violate § 1.
The second line of analysis is not really an analysis at all. A
restraint will get "per se" treatment if it is so unreasonable on its
face, or has historically been so unreasonable, that there is no need
to inquire further into the actual effects the restraint has on the
market.6'
Such a restraint is "per se" unlawful under § 1.
However, recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on when the
per se rule should be applied. In general, the courts are reluctant to
label something "per se" without at least entertaining the
defendant's arguments that a restraint is procompetitive in some
63
way.

IV. HORIZONTAL MARKET DIvIsIONs UNDER § 1 OF THE SHERMAN

ACT
In essence, each major sports league has rules that restrict
franchise movement. Each of the rules is based on the idea that
franchises have a "home territory" in which they have exclusive
rights. This territorial allocation is a division of the United States'
59. Id. at 238.
60. United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400
(1956).
61. SULLIVAN & HARRIsON, supra note 31, at § 6.04[A][4].
62. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,

692 (1978).
63. See Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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markets by the sports leagues. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
reaches agreements that allocate specific territories to individual
entities.' 4 Currently, baseball's relocation rules are exempt from
attack under the trilogy of Supreme Court cases granting baseball
an antitrust exemption. 65
However, as is evident from the
reasoning in those cases, the exemption is on shaky ground. If the
antitrust exemption is taken away, then § l's prohibition of
horizontal market divisions may affect the relocation rules of
Major League Baseball.
Obviously, because of baseball's long-standing exemption, there
are no baseball cases on horizontal market divisions to lend
guidance. However, there is a long line of non-sports cases in
which the parameters of the § 1 prohibitions have been examined. 6
In addition, because the National Football League, National
Hockey League, and National Basketball Association are not
exempt from the antitrust laws,6 7 there is a line of sports cases that
may indicate what effect a repeal of the baseball exemption would
have on baseball franchise relocations. 8
64. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Agreements that
divIde up markets are designed to control participation in certain markets.
SULLIVAN & HARRIsoN, supra note 31, at § 4.14. When competition is reduced
in this manner, the participants in that market no longer need to compete at any
level. Id. Some consIder horizontal market divisions more dangerous than
price fixing because with horizontal market divisions, there is no competition
for any facet of the product. See Id.
65. See supra part II.
66. See infra part IV[A].
67. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(football); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F.Supp.
966 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (hockey); Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401
U.S. 1204 (1971) (basketball). See also North American Soccer League v.
National Football League, 465 F.Supp. 665 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (soccer).
68. Note, this is an entirely different issue than whether a sports league has
the right to deny ownership to a group attempting to buy an existing team. See
Levin v. National Basketball Association, 385 F.Supp. 149 (S.D. N.Y. 1974);
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420 (E.D. Penn. 1993). It is also
a different issue than the granting of expansion franchises. See MId-South
Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550 F.Supp. 558 (E.D. Penn. 1982)
affirmed 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
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A. Non-Sports Cases
The courts have on many occasions addressed § l's treatment of
horizontal market divisions. The cases before 1978 tend to apply §
1 more strictly, 69 whereas the trend since 1978 has been to adopt a
reasonableness approach for all but the most pernicious
violations." One of the pre-1978 cases was United States v. Topco
Associates, in which the Supreme Court ruled that horizontal
agreements to divide markets are per se violations of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.7" While the post-1978 cases appeared to cut back on
the harshness of the Topco approach, the Court has since revived
Topco's per se stance as recently as 1990.72 As a result, it is
dangerous to assume that any one standard can be applied to
horizontal market divisions.
Probably the pre-1978 case that most resembles baseball's
territorial allocations is United States v. Sealy.73 In Sealy
individual mattress manufacturers came together to form a
corporation known as Sealy.74 Sealy, as a corporation, then
provided each of the businesses with a license to sell mattresses
only in a specified geographic area.75 Apparently this structure was
designed to avoid per se treatment under § 1 by disguising a
horizontal market division in the form of a vertical market
division.76 The Court pierced the form and decided the case as a
69. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
70. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, 776 F.2d 185 (7th
Cir. 1985).
71. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
72. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
73. United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
74. Id. at 351.
75. Id.
76. See Id. at 354. Vertical market divisions are also subject to § l's reach.
However, vertical market divisions had long been dealt with under a rule of
reason analysis, which is obviously more favorable for defendants than per se
treatment is. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1967). Note,
however, that in the same year Sealy was decIded, the Supreme Court ruled that
vertical territorial restraints can be per se unlawful. United States v. Arnold,
Schwirm & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Schwinn has since been overruled and
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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horizontal market division case.77 The Court said the corporation
was a mere instrumentality because the individual licensees were
in complete control of Sealy as joint venturers. In the end, the
Court found a per se violation of § 1.71
The analogy between Sealy and baseball should be clear. Like
Sealy, major league baseball teams came together to form a larger
organization: Major League Baseball. Major League Baseball
then granted each of the teams a license to operate exclusively in a
particular market of the United States. In accord with the Court's
analysis in Sealy, the individual licensees in baseball were in
complete control of Major League Baseball as joint venturers. 0
The similarity between Sealy and the organizational structure of
Major League Baseball would make it appear that a repeal of
baseball's antitrust exemption would doom baseball's relocation
rules. 8 However, since 1978, the Court has been more willing to
listen to defendants' procompetitive justifications for horizontal
market divisions. As a result, just because Major League Baseball
is organized similarly to Sealy does not necessarily mean that its
relocation rules would constitute a per se violation under § 1.
The first case to clearly cut back on per se treatment for
vertical market divisions once again receive rule of reason treatment.
Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Supreme
Court's decision in State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 118 Sup. Ct. 275, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199
(1996) overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 19 L. Ed. 2d 998, 88
Sup. Ct. 869 and holding that vertical agreements fixing maximum retail prices
are to be judged under the rule of reason makes complete the Court's
philosophy of treating vertical restraints under the rule of reason. However,
these cases do not Seem relevant to MLB's system of exclusive territorial
restraints which are, in essence, horizontal.
77. Sealy, 388 U.S. at 354.
78. Id.

79. See Id. at 357-58. The court's application of the per se "analysis" was
further bolstered by the price-fixing aspects of the Sealy arrangement. Id.
80. See Id.

81. Again, however, it should be noted that baseball does not appear. to have
any of the price-fixing characteristics that underscored the per se treatment in
Sealy. See supra note 64. In fact, once ticket prices are adjusted for inflation, it
can be seen that the cost of a general admission ticket was lower in 1990 than in
1950. ZIMBALIST, supra note 7, at 51.
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horizontal market divisions was BroadcastMusic v. CBS (BM).82
In BMI, individual composers gave non-exclusive licenses to BMI,
who then sold blanket licenses to businesses who wanted to use the
music. 3 The amount received on the sale was divided among all
composers but each individual composer remained free to sell on
her own. 4 The Supreme Court declined to apply a per se analysis
and listened to BMI's procompetitive justifications."
BMI argued that given the number of compositions a composer
develops, it is impossible for an individual composer to police all
of her own copyrights.86 BMI argued that a middleman was
necessary to keep transaction costs down." The Court accepted
these justifications as procompetitive and remanded the case on
orders to apply a rule of reason analysis.88 On remand, the Second
Circuit weighed the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement and
the procompetitive effects of the arrangement before ruling for
BMI. s9 Essentially, the procompetitive effect was that a blanket
license provided by BMI was an entirely different product than the
product the composers produced individually.9" Creation of a new
product is on its face procompetitive.9" On the other hand, there
was nothing anticompetitive about the arrangement because
individual composers remain free to sell their compositions on
their own.9"
Thus, the BMI case represents the Court's
acknowledgment that it would entertain procompetitive arguments
before striking down a horizontal restraint.
The Supreme Court reinforced its position in BMI five years
82. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
83. Seeld. at5
84. See Id. at 11
85. See Id. at 18.
86. Id. at 20.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 24-25.
89. Columbia Broadcasting System v. American Soc'y of Composers and
Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1980).
90. BroadcastMusic, 441 U.S. at 21-22.
91. Id.
92. See Id. at 23-24
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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later. In NCAA v. Board of Regents,93 the Court addressed the
NCAA's television plan. Under the plan, the members of the
NCAA joint venture agreed on how they would sell television
rights.94 Under the agreement, the networks were limited in the
games they could show.95 As a result, many of the smaller schools
were left out.96 Instead of giving the arrangement per se treatment,
the Court recognized that some type of horizontal agreement had to
exist in order for college football to exist as an entertainment
product.9 7 This recognition meant that the NCAA's arrangement
would be analyzed under the rule of reason. 8
As is evident from the BMI and NCAA cases, the harshness of
the per se rule is tempered where a horizontal agreement is
necessary to create a new product. However, the Court has not
abandoned per se treatment of horizontal market divisions
entirely.9 9 Therefore, it is crucial that Major League Baseball be
able to argue that its agreements are necessary to create a new
product.
B. Sports Cases
Presumably if the baseball exemption was taken away, baseball
would be treated similarly to the other major professional sports,
which have no antitrust exemption."
The cases that analyze
93. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
94. Id. at 92.
95. Id. at 92-93.
96. See Id. at 99.
97. Id. at 101-02.
98. Id. at 103. While the rule of reason is the favored analysis from a
defendant's perspective, it is not a guaranteed win. In NCAA, the defendants
asserted enough procompetitive justifications to get out of a per se violation.
See Id. However, once the rule of reason was applied, the defendants could not
come up with enough evIdence of procompetitive effects to outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of the arrangement. Id. at 104-05. As a result, the
NCAA lost the case. Id. at 120.
99. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
100. See supranote 52.
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horizontal market divisions in a sports context bear out the BMI
and NCAA defenses to per se treatment under § 1. Uniformly the
courts hold that sports leagues are subject to a rule of reason
analysis because of the unique characteristics of the sports
industry.10 1
The earliest important relocation case involved an attempt by the
San Francisco Seals of the NHL to move to Vancouver.' "° Rule
4.1(c) of the NHL's constitution provided that each club had
exclusive territorial rights in its home city and within 50 miles of
the city limits.' 3 Rule 4.2 provided that no member could transfer
its franchise to a different city without consent of three-fourths of
league members.'
The Seals formally applied for the right to
relocate to Vancouver and were denied.' °5 The Seals then brought
suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act.' °6
The Seals opinion first deals with whether the NHL is a single
entity for purposes of analysis under § 1. The court found that
individual teams acted together as a single business enterprise and
07
that the teams are not competitors in the economic sense.'
Although the court does not appear to say this takes the NIL out
of the reach of § 1, its argument that the NHL is a single entity
would preclude a § 1 violation.' °8
101. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550
F.Supp. 558, 566 (E.D. Penn. 1982) affirmed 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983)
102. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F.Supp. 966
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
103. Id. at 967.
104. Id. at 968.
105. Id.
106. See Id. The plaintiffs also claimed a § 2 violation but the court ruled
they dId not have standing to sue under that section. Id. at 971.
107. Id. at 969.
108. Whether a sports league is a single entity is the source of much
commentary and litigation. Several important cases deal with this issue in a
context outsIde of the relocation question. See, e.g., North American Soccer
League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that the NFL is not a single economic entity); MId-South Grizzlies v.
National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding the NFL is
a single entity at least where the new franchise would not share a geographic
market with another franchise); Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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Although the plaintiffs attempted to rely on Topco for per se
treatment, the court instead applied a rule of reason analysis,
although it did not label its analysis as such.1"9 The court first
defined the relevant market as professional hockey games in front
of live audiences in the United States and Canada.1 The court
then said that the organizational structure of the NHL did not
impose any restraints in the relevant market, "but rather makes
possible a segment of commercial activity which could hardly exist
without it.' '.
Thus, the court set forth a BMI-type rationale five
years before BMI was decided by the Supreme Court. In the end,
the court concluded that the NHL's rules did not violate § 1
because the parties were not economic competitors and the
territorial restraints had no anticompetitive effect on the relevant
12
market.1
The Seals opinion has been overshadowed, however, in the wake
of the litigation allowing the NFL's Raiders to move from Oakland
to Los Angeles. There are six reported opinions in connection with
the Raiders litigation, including the 1984 decision of the 9th
Circuit to allow the move." 3 The dispute arose after the Los
Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the NBA is a
single-entity for some purposes but not others). For a comprehensive discussion
on the single-entity theory, See Michael S. Jacobs, ProfessionalSports Leagues,
Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND.
L.J. 25 (1991).
109. See Id. at 970.
110. Id. at 969.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 970. It is difficult to tell exactly what the Seals holding rests on.
On the one hand, its single-entity argument would preclude a § 1 violation
altogether. On the other hand, the court goes on to find that the arrangement
creates a new product. It uses both of these arguments to defeat plaintiffs
Topco analogy but essentially rules for defendant because of the absence of
anticompetitive effects.
113. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League,
468 F.Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (granting NFL's motion to dismiss with leave
to amend the complaint); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 484 F.Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (granting RaIders motion
for preliminary injunction) rev'd, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980); Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F.Supp. 581
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Angeles Rams decided to play in Anaheim beginning in the 198081 season.'14 This left the Los Angeles Coliseum without a
team."' The Coliseum began courting Al Davis, the owner of the
Oakland Raiders,
in the hope of bringing the Raiders to Los
6
11

Angeles.

The primary obstacle to the move was NFL Rule 4.3 which
provided that unanimous approval was required for a franchise to
move into the home territory of another franchise.1 17 Rule 4.1
defines "home territory" as the city in which another team is
located and within 75 miles of all directions of the city limits." 8
The Coliseum brought suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act but the
suit was dismissed because no NFL team was committed to
moving to Los Angeles." 9 Despite the dismissal, the NFL got
nervous and amended Rule 4.3 to require only three-fourths
approval. 2 Once the discussions with Al Davis became more
concrete, the Coliseum renewed its suit.'
The NFL then voted
(C.D. Cal. 1981) (granting directed verdict for RaIders on single-entity issue);
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League
("RaIders I"), 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming Raiders victory on
liability issue); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League ("RaIders II"), 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming treble damages
for the Coliseum but vacating the damage award for the RaIders).
114. RaIders 1, 726 F.2d at 1384. Interestingly, the Rams are currently
attempting to find a new stadium to play in. Associated Press, Rams on the
Verge of St. Louis Lease, THE GAINESVILLE SuN, December 14, 1994, at 3C.
The city of St. Louis is wooing them and the Rams appear poised to move if the
NFL does not agree to build a football-only stadium in Los Angeles. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1384. Davis' lease with the Oakland Coliseum expired in 1978.
Id. After unsuccessful negotiations with the Oakland Coliseum to improve the
facility, Davis entered into discussions with the Los Angeles Coliseum. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Even though the Rams had moved to Anaheim, they were still
within 75 miles of the Los Angeles Coliseum. Id. at 1385.
119. Id. The court found there was no justiciable controversy. Id.
120. Id. The original version of Rule 4.3 only required a three-fourths vote
if a team was requesting a move to an unoccupied city. Id. The amendment
reduced the vote from 100% to 75% when a team was requesting a move into
the home territory of another team.
121. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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22-0 to block the move.
The 9th Circuit's Raiders I opinion thoroughly addressed the
two elements of § 1 that were at issue: the concerted action
element23 and the unreasonable restraint element. 124 As to the
concerted action element, the court acknowledged that the NFL
was a joint venture and that some cooperation is necessary to
maintain the league.22 However, it offered three reasons for not
considering the NFL a single-entity:
1. If the NFL were a single-entity, it would make it impossible
for the NFL to ever violate § 1;126
2. Other unitary organizations that were just as dependent on
cooperation had been found to violate § 1;27 and
28
3. The NFL clubs are separate business entities.
The court analogized the NFL structure to the structure in Sealy
and concluded that the NFL was not a single-entity and was subject
to § 1.129
As for its analysis of the reasonableness of the rule, the court
rejected a per se approach because it realized that some agreements
between members of a joint venture are necessary. 31 In applying
the rule of reason, the court first attempted to determine the
relevant market. 3 ' The Raiders said the relevant market was NFL

122. Id. There were five abstentions. Id.
123. Id. at 1387. The lower court granted a directed verdict for plaintiffs on
the concerted action issue. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 519 F.Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
124. RaIders I, 726 F.2d at 1390.
125. Id. at 1387-88.

126. Id. at 1388.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1388-89. The court saId the clubs are independently owned, have
independent value, and although revenues are shared, profits and losses are not.
Id. at 1389. In addition, the clubs compete with one another off the field to
acquire players, coaches, and management personnel. Id. at 1390.
129. Id. The court noted that Seals had reached the opposite conclusion. Id.
at 1390 n. 4. However, the court decided against the Seals approach on grounds
that the competitive harms and benefits of Rule 4.3 should be analyzed under
the rule of reason, and should not be given blanket immunity. Id.
130. Id. at 1387-88.
131. Id. at 1392.
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football in the Southern California area. 32 The Coliseum said the
relevant market was stadiums offering facilities to NFL teams in
the entire United States.133 The NFL said, in an attempt to define
the market as broadly as possible so as to reduce the chances of
anticompetitive effects, that the relevant market was all forms of
entertainment in the United States.1 4 But after devoting two full
pages of the opinion to the parties' arguments, the court
determined that the relevant market was not the issue.3 5 Instead,
the court said the focus should be on whether Rule 4.3 reasonably
served the League's interest in producing its product. 36
In its reasonableness analysis, the court found two primary
anticompetitive effects inherent in Rule 4.3. First, the court said
the exclusive territories prevent competition within the NFL
market, allowing teams to set monopoly prices in their
territories.137 Second, the exclusive territories prevent stadiums
from luring other teams to their facilities.138 On the procompetitive
side, the NFL argued that Rule 4.3 promoted regional balance,
aided financial stability,'39 ensured parity in the league, and
fostered fan loyalty.141 In addition, the NFL argued that it
prevented transfers before local governments could recoup their
investments.41 The court, however, ruled against the NFL because
Rule 4.3 contained no requirements to ensure that those
132. Id. at 1393.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1394. The court stated that the "exceptional nature of the industry
[B]ecause of the
makes precise market definition especially difficult.
exceptional structure of the League, it was not necessary for the jury to accept
absolutely either the NFL's or the plaintiffs [sic] market definitions."
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1395.
138. Id.
139. While there is a large amount of financial interdependence in the NFL,
the success of the league ultimately depends on the stability of each franchise.
FREEDMAN, supra note 4, at 78. As a result, relocation restrictions are necessary
to maintain the success of the league. Id.
140. Id. at 1396.
141. Id. at 1396.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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procompetitive effects were factors in the NFL's decisions. 4 2 The
court suggested that if Rule 4.3 contained some objective
guidelines and procedural safeguards, it would be on a surer
43
antitrust footing.'
Judge Williams filed a lengthy separate opinion in Raiders I
which focused primarily on the court's single-entity ruling.'" He
argued vigorously that the NFL teams cannot truly be separated
from the league and that they do not compete in any economic
sense. 45 However, the gist of this theory appears to be that the
NFL clubs should be considered a single-entity for some of their
46
activities, but independent actors for others.
RaidersI appeared to invalidate the NFL's Rule 4.3 under § 1 of
the Sherman Act. However, in the course of deciding the damages
appeal in RaidersII, the 9th Circuit backed off from that reading of
the case.' 47 Instead, the court made clear that its finding in Raiders
I was that Rule 4.3 was invalid only as applied, not invalid on its
face.148 If Rule 4.3 had been found facially invalid, then part of the
Raiders' damage award would have been offset by the fact that
they were members of the NFL, the entity that promulgated the
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1397.
144. Id. at 1401 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 1404.
146. Id. at 1405. Those activities for which the teams should be consIdered a
single-entity are labeled "downstream output" by Judge Williams. Id. at 1406.
"Downstream output" includes all day-to-day decisions regarding the
production of professional football-the collectively produced product. Id.
Included in this "downstream output" are franchise relocation decisions because
the Executive Committee's consensus is always a result of the collective interest
of the NFL. Id.
On the other hand, the activities for which the teams should not be
consIdered a single-entity are labeled "upstream flow" by Judge Williams. Id.
This term applies to the services of players and coaches, television services and
other aspects of each member club's independent Identity. Id. Williams argues
that § 1 of the Sherman Act should be applied to the "upstream flow" of
products and services.
147. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League
("RaIders II"), 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986)
148. Id. at 1375.
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rule. 4 9

On the other hand, if Rule 4.3 was only invalid as applied,
the damages would not be offset because the Raiders did not
participate in the application of the rule.15 The court said Raiders
I found for the Raiders only after examining the conduct and
markets involved in the Raiders' move.'
As a result, Raiders I
1 2
1
applied.
as
4.3
Rule
only invalidated
If there was any question as to whether the 9th Circuit meant
what it said in Raiders H, that question was answered in NBA v.
5 3 In SDC, the San Diego Clippers franchise
SDC Basketball Club."
wanted to move from San Diego to Los Angeles.1 4 The club
started to move but the NBA threatened suit under an article of the
NBA Constitution which prevented franchise moves without
league approval. 5 The Clippers abandoned the idea.'56 However,
the day after Raiders I was decided, the similarity of the NBA's
rule to the NFL's rule caused the Clippers to announce the move
again. 57 This time when the NBA threatened suit, the Clippers

149. Id. at 1369.
150. See Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1375.
153. National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 484 U.S. 960 (1987).
154. Id. at 564.
155. Id. Article 9 of the NBA Constitution provIded that no team could
move into the home territory of another team without that team's approval. Id.
The Clippers met this requirement because the Los Angeles Lakers had
executed a waiver. Id. However, the NBA argued that the league as a whole
must be permitted to approve of the move because it was the only way to
enforce other articles of the NBA Constitution provIding for exclusive
territories. Id. The NBA then adopted Article 9A which set forth this practice
explicitly. Id. The Clippers argued that 9A could not be consIdered for
purposes of the litigation because 9A was an amendment to the NBA
Constitution and required unanimous approval. Id. The Clippers had not voted
for the amendment. Id. Since the court only ruled on the correctness of the
summary judgment ordered by the district court, it never decIded whether 9A
was in effect for the purposes of the litigation. See Id. at 565.
156. Id. at 564.
157. Id.
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countered with threats of antitrust litigation."5 8 The NBA backed
off, scheduled the Clippers' games in Los Angeles, and then
brought an action for declaratory relief.159
The district court granted summary judgment for the Clippers on
the basis of the holding in Raiders L 6 ' The 9th Circuit reversed,
reiterating its position in Raiders II that the NFL rule was invalid
only as applied. 6' The court said nothing in Raiders I should be
read to mean that a franchise movement rule is facially invalid
under § 1 of the Sherman Act.'62 The Clippers noted the absence
of "objective factors" and procedural safeguards in the NBA's
franchise movement rule. 63 However, the court said that the
objective factors suggested in Raiders I are not requirements, but
rather, are "well-advised."'" As a result, the case was reversed and
remanded for trial.'65
V. BASEBALL'S RELOCATION POLICY
Having set the stage with both non-sports and sports horizontal
market division cases, the trends in the decisions can be analyzed
and applied to baseball's franchise relocation rules. At the outset,
it should be noted that baseball's relocation rules vary from those
of the NHL, NFL, and NBA. As a result, the outcomes in the cases
in part IV might be different had they construed baseball's
158. Id.
159. Id. The NBA sought an order that the league could consIder the
Clippers move and sanction the Clippers for not submitting the move to league
approval. Id. at 564-65.
160. Id. at 565.
161. Id. at 567.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 568.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 570. There is no reported decision on the remand to the trial court
but the Clippers appealed to the United States Supreme Court from the 9th
Circuit's decision.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 484 U.S. 960 (1987).
The Supreme Court dismissed
certiorari. Id.
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relocation rules.
A. The CurrentRules
The National League and American League began as separate
entities: the National League in 1876 and the American League in
1900.166 In 1902 the two leagues entered into an agreement by
which they would operate as separate but equal leagues bound by
167
the same playing rules, schedules, and player contracts.
However, as separate leagues, they were allowed to develop their
own internal governance rules. As a result, the current "home
territory" rules differ between the American and National Leagues.
In the National League, a franchise has exclusive rights in its
home city within the city limits plus 10 miles in all directions of
the city limits.'68 In the American League, a franchise has
exclusive rights within 100 miles of its ballpark. 69 As a result, no
team in either league may move into the home territory of a
preexisting team from the same league. To move to any currently
unoccupied city with a population under 2.4 million requires the
approval of three-fourths of the teams. 70 If the unoccupied city
has a population over 2.4 million, no approval appears to be
required.17 ' As for interleague moves, a franchise from one league
can move into a city already occupied by a team from the other
league as long as its ballpark is at least five miles away from the

166. DavId Q. Voit, The History of Major League Baseball, in TOTAL
BASEBALL 7, 10& 15 (John Thorn & Pete Palmer eds., 1989). The American
League grew out of the Western League, which was begun in 1894. Id. at 15.
167. Id.
168. JESSE W. MARKHAM & PAUL V. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND

PUBLIC POLICY 108 (1981).

169. See Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Based on 1994 population figures, none of the currently unoccupied
cities or metropolitan areas have a population exceeding 2.4 million. U.S.

Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 42, Table no. 43
(1l6th ed., 1996).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2

26

Hurst and McFarland: The Effect of Repeal of the Baseball Antitrust Exemption on Franc

1998]

BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

289

preexisting team's ballpark.172 However, if the already-occupied
city has a population of less than 2.4 million, three-fourths of the
17
teams must approve.
B. The Futureof Baseball'sRelocation Limitations
The § 1 cases in a sports context point out several trends in
determining the effect a repeal of baseball's antitrust exemption
would have on franchise relocations in Major League Baseball.
The most noticeable trend is the rule of reason treatment that is
uniformly given to sports leagues because of the unique product
created by.their joint efforts. 74 This is consistent with the "new
product defense" first encountered in BMI and NCAA.175 However,
in terms of results of the reasonableness analysis, the teams seem
to get different treatment depending on whether they attempt to
move to an unoccupied city or whether they attempt to move to an
already-occupied city. 76 Similarly, the courts uniformly grapple
with whether sports leagues are a single-entity for § 1 purposes.177
However, the trend is found only in the attempt to analyze the
problem, not in the results. Nevertheless, an examination of the
172. MARKHAM & TEPLITZ, supra note 153, at 109.
173. Id. No approval is necessary for interleague moves to cities with a
population greater than 2.4 million. Id. Although this would appear to make
larger cities susceptible to three major league teams, this is not an economically
attractive alternative. Even when New York had three teams annual attendance
at Giants and Dodgers games steadily declined. Id. at 108.
174. See supra part IV[B]
A baseball club cannot produce absent
cooperation with its on-the-field competitors because of league scheduling,
some revenue sharing, and post-season arrangements. MARKHAM & TEPLITZ,
supra note 153, at 19. In addition, the quality of the baseball games cannot be
determined by any one team. Id. at 21. As a result, the agreements between
Major League Baseball teams create a product that could not otherwise exist
absent the agreements.
175. See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
176. See San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F.Supp.
966 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football
League ("RaIders I"), 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
177. See supra notes 92-93, 110-114 and accompanying text.
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case law on these two fundamental factors of § 1 jurisprudence
should lend some guidance as to the future of baseball's relocation
rules.
1. Single-Entity Theory
The struggle to categorize sports leagues as single-entities or
independent actors is a result of the unique structure of sports
leagues.178 For example, in baseball, the individual clubs control
certain aspects of the game like personnel decisions, ticket prices,
and local television agreements179 . On the other hand, the league
controls other aspects of the game like playing rules, national
television contracts, and expansion and relocation. 8 ' Because of
this unique structure, three distinct viewpoints have developed on
the single-entity issue.
First, there is the idea that sports leagues are single-entities for
all purposes. The Seals decision seems to fall into this category.
The court in Seals said that because the teams do not compete
economically, the NHL is a single-entity. 8 ' However, there are
some flaws with this reasoning. To begin with, the teams still
compete for players, managers, and in some cases, fans. The Seals
reasoning presupposes that antitrust laws are blind to noneconomic competition. In addition, the Seals reasoning is most
applicable where an existing team wishes to move to an
unoccupied city. Where an existing team wishes to move into the
178. Some commentators curiously maintain the unique nature of sports
leagues but nevertheless say that sports leagues are not single-entities when
compared to normal business practices. For example, one commentator has
written that "[w]hen the partners in a law.. .firm collectively decIde where to
locate their offices, nobody in his right mind thinks the decision should be
consIdered a conspiracy and tested for reasonableness by some judge or lay
jury." Gary R. Roberts, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws, in THE
BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 135, 142 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A.
Mangan eds., 1991).
179. See RaIders I, 726 F.2d at 1406 (Williams, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

180. See Id.
181. Seals, 379 F.Supp. at 969.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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home territory of another team, the Seals argument that the teams
do not compete economically falls apart.
The second viewpoint on the single-entity issue is the polar
opposite of the Seals approach. In Raiders I, the majority seemed
to say that since the NFL competes for players and coaches, and
since each NFL team is literally a separate business, the NFL could
never be considered a single-entity.112 Although some of the
Raiders I reasoning is weakened by the death of the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine,'83 the court is correct in noting that singleentity status would deny application of § 1 altogether.'84 The
logical extension of single-entity status for a sports league could be
that all joint ventures, because they need cooperative agreements,
would be exempt from § 1.L"' This is not consistent with case law
such as Sealy, which involved a structure similar to that of all
sports leagues.' 86 It should also be noted that because the Raiders
were attempting to move to another team's home territory, Rule
4.3 as applied had a more obvious anticompetitive effect that cried
out for § 1 protection.
The third viewpoint is the idea set forth in the dissent of Raiders
L The dissent argued that the NFL could be a single-entity for
some purposes but not for others.'87 In recognition that the teams
compete for players, equipment, and fans, the dissent argued the
NFL should not be granted single-entity status when antitrust
questions arise in those contexts.'88 On the other hand, since teams
act in concert to make day-to-day decisions, the NFL should be a
single-entity when dealing with antitrust questions in that
context.'89 This viewpoint is more consistent with the unique
structure of the sports leagues. However, it is too difficult to
pigeon-hole some of the NFL's activities into categories of "league
182. RaIders 1, 726 F.2d at 1388.
183. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
184. RaIders 1,726 F.2d at 1388.
185. See Id.
186. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
187. See supranotes 129-31 and accompanying text.
188. See supranote 131.
189. See supranote 131.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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decisions" and "team decisions" since every league decision is
made upon a vote of individual teams. It also seems to be a false
distinction: the joint decisions of the teams are either concerted
action, or they are not.
The most interesting development surrounding § l's concerted
action element was the 1984 Supreme Court decision of
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube in which the Court
reexamined the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. 190 Copperweld
held that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary
corporation are a single-entity."9' The Court said there is unilateral
action when the actors have a preexisting unity of economic
interest 9
Had Copperweld been decided a year earlier, Raiders I might
have turned out differently. Much of the Raiders I reasoning
seems to be built around the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
because the court rejects the notion that separately-owned entities
can be a unilateral actor under § 1.193 With that notion dispelled in
Copperweld, the Raiders I rationale for denial of single-entity
status to the NFL has been undennined to some degree.
Nevertheless, Copperweld does not appear to hold that all parentsubsidiary agreements are shielded from § 1.194 In addition, a
strong argument remains that granting a sports league single-entity
status would inappropriately provide a blanket exemption from the

190. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
191. Id. at 777.
192. Id. at 771. An example of not having unity of economic interest can be
found in the following hypothetical: Suppose the Minnesota Timberwolves of
the NBA are generating $60 million in revenues per year in Minneapolis, but for
whatever reasons, are losing $10 million per year. The Timberwolves then
decIde to relocate to New Orleans where they project revenues of only $50
million but project a $5 million profit per year. For the Timberwolves, it is a
sound financial move. For the league, there is $10 million less revenue to be
thrown into the revenue-sharing pot. As a result, a vote on the Timberwolves
relocation would not be based on unity of economic interest, and under
Copperweld, § l's plurality requirement would be met.
193. RaIders I, 726 F.2d at 1388.
194. See Copperweld,467 U.S. at 772 n.18.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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application of § 1.195
While Copperweld is the most recent pronouncement on the
concerted action element of § 1, it will not necessarily be followed
to the letter in the sports context. The difficulty of applying
Copperweld to sports league situations is that it presumes that a
relocation vote would be based entirely on financial concerns. 96'
However, the less revenue sharing involved in a sports league, the
more intangible factors will come into play in a relocation vote.
Depending on the weight given to those intangible factors,
Copperweld's focus may be misplaced if applied to sports league
situations.
How does this all play out in the Major League Baseball
context? If the Seals reasoning prevailed, Major League Baseball
would be considered a single-entity, at least where a team seeks to
move to an unoccupied city.'97 Where a team seeks to move to an
already-occupied city, however, Seals is of little help. If the
Raiders Ireasoning prevailed, Major League Baseball would never
be a single-entity because the individual teams compete for
players, managers and fans. 9 8 While this appears to be a harsh
view, it is difficult to dispute when a team seeks to move to an
already-occupied city. In that situation, there is clearly economic
competition as well. If the reasoning from the dissent in Raiders
!prevailed, Major League Baseball would be a single-entity for
some purposes, but not others. 99 The dissent's viewpoint appears
to be a happy compromise, but deciding when the league is a
195. See supra notes 111, 169-70 and accompanying text.
196. Well-known sportswriter Leonard Koppett has put forth the argument
that Major League Baseball club owners are not in the business for profit.
MARKHAM & TEPLITZ, supra note 153, at 27. Koppett suggests that if the
owners were Seeking profit, there are better dollar-for-dollar investments. Id.
Instead, owners are in the game for the social prestige, which means that all of
their decisions will not be based on an ordinary businessman's model. Id.
197. See supra text accompanying note 166. Markham and Teplitz noted
that from 1974-78 two of every three baseball teams lost money. MARKHAM &
TEPLITZ, supra note 153, at 101. As a result, they argue that this financial
performance is inconsistent with cartel behavior. Id. at 101-02.
198. See supra text accompanying note 167.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
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single-entity and when it is not would introduce a whole new level
of confusion into the issue. In the end, however, these three
viewpoints probably do not survive the Copperweld decision.2"
Under Copperweld, to be treated as a single-entity, Major
League Baseball would have to demonstrate a unity of economic
interest between the league and the individual teams.2"' This might
be an easier task for baseball than it would be for some other
sports. Because baseball has less revenue sharing than some other
major sports,2 "° it is reasonable to suppose that relocation votes are
based less on the financial rewards to the league as a whole, and
more on the intangible factors such as regional balance and
maintaining rivalries. As a result, it is easier to see a unity of
economic interest between Major League Baseball and its member
teams.
As we move into the future, however, this argument will be
tougher to make. In 1981 approximately 13% of all revenues were
shared by Major League Baseball teams.0 3 In 1991, that figure has
grown to approximately 39%.204 In the midst of a player strike in
which small-market teams complain they cannot handle the high
player salaries, one of the possible solutions would be increased
revenue sharing among the teams.0 5 While this might help resolve
the strike, it would probably preclude any solid arguments under
Copperweld that Major League Baseball is a single-entity for
purposes of § 1 analysis.
If baseball were found to be a single entity, it would still face a
possible charge of monopolizing or attempting to monopolize
under Sherman Act Section 2. 206However, establishing a violation

200. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
201. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
202. MARKHAM & TEPLITZ, supra note 153, at 46.
203. Id.
204. ZIMBALIST, supra note 7, at 58.
205. As of 1991, the players' salaries took up approximately 43% of team
revenue. ZIMBALIST, supra note 7, at 59.
206. 15 U.S.C. section 2 (1997).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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under Section 2 would difficult, at best. 207 The Supreme Court has
consistently held that a monopolist has no general duty to deal with
all prospective customers; thus, a refusal to award a city a new
franchise, or to discontinue a franchise with an existing city would
not, without more, constitute a violation of section 2.208
In fact, Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey
League held that the denial of an application for an expansion
franchise did not violate section 2.209The court found that refusal to
award the new franchise did not reduce competition among
existing teams, nor did it exclude competition among existing
teams becuase the proposed franchise wanted to join the league,
not compete with it. 210Seattle Totems seems to indicate that a suit
by a competing baseball league complaining of unfair exclusionary
practices would present a more serious section 2 claim against
Major League Baseball than would any action based on a franchise
relocation.
2. Rule ofReason
While the single-entity argument is attractive because it would
allow Major League Baseball a successful motion to dismiss, it is
not the strongest argument available. The cases establish that
sports leagues receive treatment under the rule of reason because of
the unique product the joint ventures produce.1 1 As to what
constitutes reasonableness, two distinct lines appear. The Seals
approach applies to teams which seek to relocate to an unoccupied
city. 212 The Raiders I approach applies to teams which seek to
207. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 at 570-71, holding that in
order to establish a violation of Sherman Act section 2, it must be shown that
defendant possessed monopoly power in a relevant product and geographic
market and that defendant has willfully exercised or used that power to maintain

its monopoly status.
208. See United States v. Colgate 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
209. 283 F2d 1347 (9th Cir., 1986).

210. Id.at 1350.
211. See supra,part IV[B].
212. See supra, notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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relocate into the home territory of another team.213 Each of these
reasonableness approaches will be examined in turn.
In Seals, the court found there was nothing anticompetitive in
denying the Seals a chance to relocate from San Francisco to
Vancouver. 14 While an argument exists that denying the Seals a
chance to participate in the Vancouver market is anticompetitive in
itself, the anticompetitive effects were outweighed by
procompetitive considerations. 21' The Seals reasoning would apply
in a baseball context because the rules regarding moves to
unoccupied cities require a three-fourths vote, just like the NHL's
rule in Seals.2 6 Thus, in a baseball context, if the Pittsburgh
Pirates tried to move the team to St. Petersburg, the Pirates could
argue that it is anticompetitive to deny them participation in the St.
Petersburg market. However, from a consumer (i.e., fan) point-ofview, it is just as anticompetitive to let the team leave Pittsburgh.
In addition, any anticompetitive effects may be outweighed by the
217
goals of regional balance, fan loyalty, and team rivalries.
As for teams who seek to move to cities already occupied by a
Major League Baseball team, the Raiders Ireasoning would apply.
In Raiders I the court found that preventing local competition
between the Raiders and Rams in Los Angeles was patently
anticompetitive ahd was not outweighed by any of the NFL's
procompetitive justifications. 18 Raiders I is directly applicable to
Major League Baseball where an interleague move is proposed.
Although the team need only stay five miles away from the
preexisting team's ballpark, if the city has less than 2.4 million
people, three-fourths of the preexisting team's league must
213. See supra, notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
214. San Francisco Seals, Ltd., v. National Hockey League, 379 F.Supp. 966
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
215. Id. at 970.
216. See supra, text accompanying note 89.
217. These procompetitive arguments are not as strong if a team like the
Seattle Mariners tried to move to a currently unoccupied city. It would be
difficult for Major League Baseball to make a fan loyalty argument or team
rivalry argument for a franchise, such as Seattle, which has a history of losing
and is less than 20 years old.
218. See supra, notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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approve." 9 It is thus similar to the NFL's three-fourths rule and
presumably would receive the same treatment that the NFL rule
received. However, baseball's rule could be seen as more
reasonable than the NFL rule because Major League Baseball
historically has been more willing to allow multi-team cities where
the circumstances are appropriate.22 ° On the other hand, there
appears to be an absolute prohibition on allowing a baseball team
to move into the home territory of another team from the same
league. This is more patently anticompetitive than the NFL's
three-fourths rule in Raiders I and presumably would fare no better
than the NFL's rule.
The important thing to remember when analyzing Raiders I is
that the 9th Circuit did not invalidate the relocation rule on its face,
only as applied.22 ' As a result, there are some relocation situations
in Major League Baseball that might pass the reasonableness test.
Unfortunately, there are no cases to give us guidance on what those
situations are. Because of this lack of guidance, the safe and
practical course for Major League Baseball is to follow the Raiders
I court's advice and incorporate some objective factors and
procedural safeguards into their relocation rules.222
First, Major League Baseball might consider relaxing the vote
requirements. The absolute prohibition on intraleague moves to
currently-occupied cities should probably be reduced to a vote. In
addition, the three-fourths vote requirement for other moves could
be relaxed. In the 1980 Raiders district court case, the court said
that a three-fourths rule was more restrictive than necessary and
that a majority vote might be appropriate.2 3 While reducing the
219. See supra, note 155 and accompanying text.
220. Currently three cities have more than one Major League Baseball team:
New York, Chicago, and San Francisco-Oakland. Only one city in the National
Football League has more than one team, New York, and the NFL has never had
more than three such cities. The NHL only has one multi-team city and the
NBA two, if New York and New Jersey are treated as one.
221. See supra, notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
222. See supra,notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
223. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League,
484 F.Supp. 1274, 1277 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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three-fourths vote to 51% might be going too far, Major League
22 4
Baseball should probably back off to at least a two-thirds rule.
A relaxing of the vote requirements might not be necessary,
however, if some objective factors were incorporated into the
relocation rules. Major League Baseball can assert the same
procompetitive justifications that the NFL did in Raiders L225 But
assertions were not enough for the court. 226 The 9th Circuit
suggested that some of those justifications be built into the league
227
rules to assure they were being considered during the vote.
Major League Baseball already incorporates a population
consideration into its rules by not requiring a vote when 2the
28
proposed move is to a city with greater than 2.4 million people.
From a practical standpoint, this does not carry much weight since
only one unoccupied city meets that criteria.229. However, it does
show that baseball is considering population as a factor. Other
factors which should be incorporated include:
"economic projections;
"regional balance;
"quality of facilities;
* fan loyalty;
"team rivalries; and
2 30
"durational limits to allow cities to recoup their losses.
As any avid baseball fan realizes, most of these factors are
considered in all league votes concerning individual teams.
However, the point is not only whether the factors are considered,
but whether Major League Baseball can prove to the court that they
224. In the RaIders litigation, if the NFL's rule had a more relaxed voting
requirement, it may have been found reasonable and the RaIders move would
have been blocked. After all, because the league voted 22-0 to block the move,
any reasonable voting requirement would have kept the RaIders out of Los
Angeles.
225. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League
("RaIders I"), 726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984).
226. Id. at 1397.
227. Id.
228. See supra,note 155.
229. See supra,note 156.
230. RaIders I, 726 F.2d at 1397.
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are considered. The only sure way to prove these factors are
examined is to incorporate at least some of them into the relocation
rules. Since they are being considered by the owners anyway, it
does not seem like an onerous burden for the factors to be codified,
however loosely.
Regardless of whether baseball losses its antitrust exemption,
one threat it need not fear is suits by cities from which a franchise
is being removed. A number of barriers exist which make such a
suit unlikely to succeed. First, a city will unuslly lack standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act because it could not show that it
was "...injured in its business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 31This is because the courts have
held that a governmental unit may not recover for general
economic injury to its citizenry resulting from an antitrust
violation.232 Furthermore, even if a city did have standing, it would
have difficulty satisfying the requirement that it show an
"anticompetitive effect" in a relevant geographic market as a result
of a team's movement.233 The problem is that the net effect on
competition resulting from a franchise's movement from one city
to another is zero; that is, the gain in consumer welfare realized by
consumers in the city to which the team relocated counterbalances
the loss to consumers in the city from which the franchise has
moved. 3 4 Furthermore, the very process of competitive bidding
among cities, which lures a franchise to relocate, which anathema
to consumers in the losing city, is exactly the type of vigorous
competitive conduct which the antitrust alws are designed to
235 In fact, probably the only realistic opportunity for
encourage.
a
city to succeed in a suit against the relocating team is if the move
constitutes a breach of a lease with a municipally owned stadium.
Thus, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football
League, plaintiff successfully argued that it suffered an economic
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

15 U.S.C. section 15(a) (1996).
Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251, at 263-65 (1972).
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
Id. at 489.
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League, 791 F2d

1356 at 1364 (1986).
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loss from the NFL's efforts to prevent the Oakland Raiders from
honoring 6its contract to play its home games in plaintiffs
23
stadium.
Similarly, it is unlikely that a city could successfully claim that
refusal of Major League Baseball to provide a replacement team
for a relocating franchise violates the Sherman Act. In Mid-South
Grizzlies v. National Football League, the court held that the NFL's
denial of an expansion franchise to Memphis, a former World
Football League applicant, did not violate the antitrust laws.237The
courts pointed out that the league's refusal to admit new teams did
not lessen competition among existing teams; thus it had no
"anticompetitive effect."23 Indeed, the court, suggested, the action
was actually pro-competitive since it left the City of Memphis
available9 as an attractive site for a franchise to any newly formed
23
league.
The only decision involving baseball holding to the contrary was
a Circuit Court decision in State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc. in
which the Circuit Court issued an injunction barring the
Milwaukee Braves from moving to Atlanta unless the league
provided a replacement team.240However, the decision was
reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court because it found that the
Wisconsin antitrust laws, on which the Circuit Court based its
decision, were pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause and
Commerce Clause by the Federal Antitrust exemption.24'However,
aside from the pre-emption issue, the lower courts decision appears
to be unsound. It's finding that baseball is a "quasi-public
institution" in nature is questionable, at best.242Furthermore, there
236. Id. at 1364-65.
237. 720 F.2d 772 (1983).
238. Id. at 785-87.
239. Id. at 786. For a contrary point of view See, Christian M. McBurney,
The Legality of Sport's Leagues' Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 925 (1985).
240. 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH para. 71,738 (Wis. Cir.Ct.) rev'd on other
grounds, 144 N.W. 1 (Wis. 1966).
241. 144 N.W. 2d 1 at 11 (1966).
242. 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 82,373.
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was no basis for the courts' conclusion that the move had an
anticompetitive effect.
V. CONCLUSION

As things stand now, Major League Baseball need not be overly
concerned about the antitrust legality of its relocation rules because
it still has its antitrust exemption. However, the call is being
sounded louder than ever for Congress to revoke baseball's
antitrust exemption, or at least for Congress to narrow its scope.243
If the baseball exemption is revoked, it might prompt a few
baseball franchises to attempt a relocation. If baseball makes some
minor revisions to its relocation rules, it will be able to block the
moves when necessary, reducing even further the risk that it might
be found to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. Without these
revisions some danger might still exist.
From a practical point-of-view, however, even if baseball's
relocation rules were found to violate § 1, team movement would
be minimal. Only a few cities in the United States and Canada that
currently are without a team could support even one Major League
Baseball team.2" Indeed, the smaller markets that currently have a
team (e.g., Milwaukee, Kansas City) constantly complain they are
losing money.24 Even fewer cities could sustain multiple teams.246
243. Futhermore, within the past five years, two courts have explicitly
questioned whether baseball's antitrust exemption should extend beyond the
reserve clause. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F.Supp. 420 at 435-440
(E.D. Pa., 1993); Butterworth. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
644 So.2d 1021 at 1023-4 (Fl. 1994). However, given the Supreme Court's
repeated reaffirmation of the exemption, it seems unlikely that it would be
modified or limited judicially.
244. As of 1975, it was estimated that a city's metropolitan population must
be at least one million to sustain a team. MARKHAM & TEPLITZ, supranote 153,
at 23. Given the way salaries and other costs have escalated over the past 19
years, it seems likely that a city's metropolitan population must be even higher
in 1994. However, the Markham and Teplitz study acknowledges that cities
have intangible factors that affect whether it can support a team. Id. at 68. As a
result, the one million figure is not necessarily accurate. See Id. at 69.
245. Some commentators have suggested that the losses shown by major
league teams are a reflection of the flexibility of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles. ZIMBALIST, supra note 7, at 62. However, even if
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Studies show that even in those cities that can support two teams,
each club has lower attendance than they would have in smaller
unoccupied cities.247 So from a practical standpoint, if § 1 gave
teams more freedom to relocate, or alternatively, if Major League
Baseball's relocation rules were relaxed, teams would not be
economically motivated to abandon their current cities en masse.2 48
Major League Baseball is financially healthy, it is hardly reaping the kind of
profits traditionally associated with cartel behavior. Id. at 69.
246. Id. at 109-10
247. MARKHAM & TEPLITZ, supra note 153, at 70. For example, in the ten
years before the Oakland Athletics moved into the metropolitan area, the San
Francisco Giants averaged approximately 1.5 million fans per year. Id. After
the Athletics' move, the Giants only exceeded that average in one season out of
the next eleven. Id. In six of those years, the Giants only enjoyed half the
number of fans that it averaged in the prior ten years. Id. at 71.
There is a limitation to this data. A team's won-loss record is always a
factor in attendance. In the 10 years before the Athletics' move, the Giants
averaged 88 wins per season. TOTAL BASEBALL (John Thom & Pete Palmer
eds., 1989) (figures compiled by author). In the first eleven years after the
move, the Giants averaged 81 wins per season. Id. The Athletics experienced
slightly better attendance but averaged 87 wins per season during those same
eleven years, including three American League Pennants and three consecutive
World Series victories. Id. By all indications, however, the Giants could not
have approached their average attendance from the prior ten years no matter
how many wins they amassed. In only three of the eleven years after the
Athletics' move, dId the combined attendance at Athletics and Giants games
significantly exceed the Giants' average prior to the Athletics' move.
MARKHAM & TEPLITZ, supranote 153, at 71.
248. Between 1950 and 1984, 15 football teams changed cities, 28 basketball
teams changed cities, and 14 hockey teams changed cities. FREEDMAN, supra
note 4, at 79. In that same time span, only ten baseball teams moved, and none
since the Washington Senators moved to Arlington in 1972. ZIMBALIST, supra
note 7, at 125. This may be because football, basketball, and hockey are less
dependent on a continued fan base than baseball is. In 1993, the NFL drew a
total regular season attendance of 14,772,000; the NBA had a total attendance
of 19,117,00 million., while the NHL's total attendance was 15,714,000. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 257

Table no. 412 (1996). Major League Baseball, on the other hand, drew total
regular season attendance in 1993 of 70,257,000, more than the total attendance
for the other three major sports combined. Id. Based on the attendance figures,
it appears that baseball is more dependent on fan support from its home city
than are teams in other major sports.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/2
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